"The Brief" - The ALA Blog

In the Beginning: ALA’s Early Days

By Edward J. Kionka

        The California Academy of Appellate Lawyers, formed in 1972, has sometimes claimed to be the oldest organization in America devoted to appellate practice. But in a 2023 article in the CSCHS Review, the author acknowledged that CAAL founder Ed Lascher “was aware of the Illinois Appellate Lawyers Association, formed in 1968,” citing a July 30, 1970, letter from Francis D. Morrissey, our second president. There is no doubt that ours is the oldest formal state-level association of appellate lawyers and that it has served as a blueprint for other state organizations, including CAAL.

        Although few written records from the ALA’s early years survive, we have indisputable evidence that we were organized in 1968 and that Sidney Z. Karasik was our founding father. His sons provided photos of two plaques. One is an award presented in appreciation of his service as ALA president in 1968-69. The other, dated May 3, 1990, reads, “in recognition of his vision and successful work as a guiding spirit and moving force of the Appellate Lawyers Association.” In his 1981 DePaul Law Review article, Sid claims only to be a “co-founder,” but all of us who were there in the early years know that the ALA was Sid’s brainchild.

        In 1968, the legal profession in the United States did not formally recognize specialties; Illinois was no exception. The ABA viewed specialization as a threat to the traditional ideal of a broad “general practice” and shelved several proposals to recognize or regulate specialties. California became the first state to adopt a pilot specialization program in 1971.

        Then, as now, Illinois attorneys could not claim to be appellate lawyers or specialists. Since 2010, however, we can state that we do or do not practice in particular fields of law, subject to certain disclaimers. See SCR Rule 7.4. The Illinois Supreme Court does not define those fields, so any Illinois lawyer is free to designate appellate practice as one of their fields.

        State’s Attorneys, the Illinois State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor (beginning in 1977), and the State Appellate Defender (beginning around 1970) handle most criminal appeals, creating a de facto criminal appellate bar. Privately retained attorneys handle about 10-20% of criminal appeals, but in 1968 it is doubtful that any would have been regarded as an appellate specialist.

        By 1968, de facto specialization in civil matters was common, but appellate practice was not typically listed among practice areas. Lawyers who practiced mainly or exclusively in certain areas were generally based in metropolitan areas. An unknown number of Illinois private practitioners — mostly in Cook County — had become what we now call appellate lawyers. Few, if any, did appeals exclusively, but they knew their way around the reviewing courts and were skilled in brief writing and appellate procedure.

        Sid Karasik was among the best. A sole practitioner in Chicago, Sid was known in his time as the “dean” of Illinois appellate lawyers. He served as counsel of record in more than 2,000 appeals.

        Sid recognized the need for an organization whose purposes, as set forth in our earliest bylaws and our 1969 annual report, were to foster and encourage “a spirit of loyalty and fraternity among appellate lawyers to promote a closer relationship between such lawyers to the end that they may become mutually helpful to one another and to further their common interest, and to encourage the highest professional and ethical standards in the prosecution of appeals.” Our first mission statements also included working with law schools, proposing new legislation and rule changes to improve appellate procedures, and assisting the Illinois reviewing court system in other ways. Until recently, our bylaws included the purposes listed below.*

        Sid immediately began recruiting members, who in turn recruited others. The earliest members included Francis D. Morrissey (Baker & McKenzie, Chicago), president 1969-70; Dom J. Rizzi (a Chicago lawyer and later an Appellate Court Justice), president 1970-71; William J. “Bill” Harte (a Chicago superlawyer), president 1972-73; Leonard Ring (a leading Chicago personal injury attorney), president 1974-75; Ted Kionka, president 1977-78; and outstanding Chicago lawyers Jerome H. Torshen, John J. Naughton, James P. Chapman, and D. Kendall Griffith, all of whom served as president. The first directors were Harry G. Fins, Joseph B. Lederleitner, Richard E. Mueller, John M. O’Conor, Jr., Thomas J. Weithers, and Leonard Ring. In 1970-71, the directors were Jim Chapman, John R. McKay, Mary M. Shaw, Robert A. Sprecher, Russell J. Topper, and Jerry Torshen.

        When the ALA’s first directory was published in 1970, we had already grown to 71.** As of this writing, we have approximately 330 members.

        In the early days, we met monthly, September through May, at 3:30 pm at the Illinois Supreme Court’s Chicago administrative office, 30 North Michigan Avenue, except for three luncheon meetings at Stouffer’s Restaurant, 24 West Madison Street. Unfortunately, we rarely gather in person now, mostly at our annual luncheons in each judicial district.

*     *     *

Notes

• *To be an organization of lawyers specializing in practice before the courts of review.
• To review systematically all pertinent legislation and rules of court affecting jurisdiction and procedure in the appeal of cases, with the aim of achieving greater clarity, fairness and comprehensiveness.
• To facilitate closer and more effective liaison between lawyers specializing in the appeal of cases and the appellate bench and the legislature.
• To improve the standards of quality and competence in the preparation of cases on appeal.
• To exchange ideas and techniques, to resolve common problems, and to discuss matters of mutual interest to those specializing in this field.

**   Marvin E. Aspen, Edward J. Barrett, Paul Peter Black, Jack E. Bowers (Downers Grove), Ronald Butler, Gerald Chapman, James P. Chapman, Benjamin H. Cohen, Robert L. Conn (Springfield, Clerk 4th Dist.), Ronald S. Cope, Thomas W. Dempsey, Sydney R. Drebin, Donald J. Duffy, Peter F. Ferracuti (Ottawa), James T. Ferrini, Harry G. Fins, Richard G. French, Elmer Gertz, Vincent J. Getzendanner, Kenneth L. Gillis, Howard C. Goldman, Irving Goodman, Gilbert Gordon, T. A. Gottfried (Ottawa), D. Kendall Griffith, William J. Harte, Edmund Hatfield, Fred Herzog, Jack E. Horsley (Mattoon), Richard W. Husted (Elgin), Horace W. Jordan, Sidney Z. Karasik, L. Louis Karton, James R. Kavanaugh, John Kennelly, Edward J. Kionka (Champaign), James O. Latturner, Joseph B Lederleitner, John R. Mackay (Wheaton), Mary Jane Mackay, James R. Mitchell, Donald T. Morrison (Waukegan), Francis D. Morrissey, Richard E. Mueller, John P. Murray, John J. Naughton, Samuel Nineberg, John M. O’Connor, Jr., Andrew J. O’Conor (Ottawa), John J. O’Toole, Francis X. Riley, Leonard M. Ring, Dom J. Rizzi, Ellis B. Rosenzweig, Mary M. Shaw, Ralph Siegel (Clerk), William T. Simmons (Mt. Vernon, Clerk 5th Dist.), Thelma B. Simon (Wilmette), Morris L. Simons, Jay Smyser, Robert A. Sprecher  (Judge), Dudley R. Sullivan, Leo J. Sullivan III (Waukegan), Marshall A. Susler (Decatur), Frederick W. Temple, James A. Thompson, Russell J. Topper, Jerome H. Torshen, Thomas M. Walsh, Thomas J. Weithers, Alfred E. Woodward (Wheaton). Except as indicated, all listed Chicago office addresses.

Shortly thereafter, we added Themis Anagnost, Vern Beck (Clerk, 1st District), John P. Crowley, John F. Grady, Robert Guritz, Mary Jane Mackay, William R. Quinlan, Nat Ozman, Richard Record (Mattoon), Philip Rock, James Truschke, Jack Watson, Meyer Weinberg, Stanley Werdell, Jim Wham (Centralia), and Leo Wykell.

There will be a retirement reception in honor of Justice Joseph P. Hettel and Justice Matthew G. Bertani n November 18, 2026, between 4:00 and 6:00 PM at the 3rd District Appellate Court (1004 Columbus Street, Ottawa, IL). 

If you wish to attend, please RSVP by November 13, 2026, by emailing AC3@illinoiscourts.gov or by calling (815) 434-5050. 

The Rising Cost of AI-Hallucinated Citations

Since ChatGPT debuted in late 2022, attorneys and pro se litigants alike have taken to outsourcing legal research and writing to generative AI. But whereas outsourcing in many spheres escapes regulation, not so in the law. Procedural rules and ethical duties across jurisdictions require legal filings created with AI’s assistance to be vetted and purged of errata. Penalties for plying courts with AI-generated fake facts and counterfeit caselaw can be severe.

The latest hefty sanction was meted out by the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, in Scott v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 2026 IL App (1st) 251462. Appellant’s counsel was fined $15,000 and reported to the ARDC for his AI-hallucinations. Id., ¶¶ 56, 82. Counsel’s opening and reply briefs contained:

Id., ¶¶ 20–28, 56.

When ordered to show cause, counsel, to his credit, acknowledged the suspect citations were in fact false. Id., ¶ 37. He “‘frequently use[s] a premier corporate subscription to ChatGPT’ to ‘synthesize complex matters,’” the case at bar included. Id. Despite personally verifying every citation via Lexis-Nexis, the ones at issue had eluded him. Id. Counsel ascribed his “‘inability to properly verify the cites’” to his inexperience with appellate work. Id. He suggested a fine of $1,000 for the non-existent case and $500 for each of the remainder. Id. Unfortunately, counsel’s response also contained misstatements of law, prompting the court to condemn it as “yet another sloppy filing.” Id., ¶¶ 38, 41. The court went on to lament that this “type of lawyering is harming . . . clients, his own professional reputation, and this court’s workflow.” ¶ 41.

Like Illinois’s first ruling on AI-misuse—In re Baby Boy, 2025 IL App (4th) 241427—on which the Scott court drew heavily, sanctions were administered under Supreme Court Rule 375. Id., ¶¶ 34, 43. That Rule gives discretion to sanction those who (a) willfully fail to abide by the Rules or (b) bring a frivolous appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 375. The Scott court ruled counsel willfully violated Rule 341(h)(5) because he doubled down in his reply brief on the sham statutory law in his opening brief. Id., ¶ 43. And since his arguments derived from a hoax (a non-existent statutory requirement), his arguments were frivolous. Id., ¶ 44.

The court considered additional non-monetary sanctions, including ordering counsel to serve a copy of the opinion upon every judge before whom he has a pending matter and ordering him to attend CLE courses. Id., ¶¶ 60–61. But uncertain whether Rule 375 allows for them, the court refrained. Id., ¶ 62. It did report counsel to the ARDC for professional misconduct. Id., ¶¶ 45, 59.

While the arguments were frivolous, the court noted the appeal was not. Id., ¶ 44. The plaintiff was a woman appealing the Illinois Human Rights Commission’s dismissal of her workplace racial discrimination charge. Id., ¶ 1. Despite counsel’s misconduct, the court declined appellees’ request to strike the briefs and dismiss the appeal. Id., ¶ 18. Citations to fictitious legal authorities, the court stressed, do not result in automatic dismissal or striking of a brief. Id., ¶ 33 (citing Baby Boy, 2025 IL App (4th) 241427, ¶ 126). The record on appeal and the pertinent statutory law enabled the court to affirm the Commission’s dismissal of appellant’s charge for lack of jurisdiction. Id., ¶¶ 1, 33.

The court ordered a fine of $1,500 per transgression. Id., ¶ 56. This rate was higher than what courts had previously imposed, and the court offered two reasons for it. Id., ¶ 57. First, a flat, as opposed to a variable, rate was in order because “there is no meaningful difference between the various types of false citations and quotations.” Id., ¶ 57. Second, “AI-hallucinated citations are an increasingly persistent problem in courts nationwide,” indicating that current fines do not deter AI-misuse. Id., ¶ 58. Thus, courts “have no choice but to increase fines . . .  until those fines have a significant deterrent effect.” Id. The court rejected the notions “that AI hallucinations are just ‘technical deficiencies’” or an unavoidable occupational hazard of modern practice. Id., ¶ 48.

This reasoning opens the prospect of even greater fines. But should fines not stifle misconduct or hit a ceiling, what then? So far, no practitioner has been disbarred for filing a brief contaminated by AI-hallucinations. But courts are already issuing temporary suspensions. See Malkeet Lnu v. Blanche, 177 F.4th 1014 (9th Cir. 2026) (suspending counsel from appearing before the court for six months). Time will tell if suspension sanctions mirror the upswing in monetary sanctions.

Author: Vitaliy Oprysko is a recent graduate from DePaul University School of Law. He is a clerk with the Keleher Appellate Law Group and has worked on appeals in the Illinois Appellate Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Seventh Circuits.

The Illinois Appellate Court is seeking highly qualified individuals for positions in the First District. 

Appellate Court Senior Research Attorney

• Location: Chicago, Illinois
• Closing Date: Septemeber 15, 2026
• Essential Responsibilities: The appellate court senior research attorney performs professional legal work in reviewing and conducting legal research, writing, and other professional legal services. Work is performed with considerable independence under the supervision of the appellate court legal research director and is reviewed through conferences and reports.
• Salary: $93,681

More about this position here.

Appellate Court Research Attorney

• Location: Chicago, Illinois
• Closing Date: Septemeber 15, 2026
• Essential Responsibilities: The First District of the Illinois Appellate Court’s Legal Research Division is seeking new graduates and experienced attorneys with a passion for legal writing and a strong interest in appellate and criminal law for the position of appellate court research attorney. The appellate court research attorneys provide crucial assistance to the justices of the First District of the Illinois Appellate Court. Responsibilities in general include researching and analyzing applicable law, and preparing draft orders and other legal documents, in matters before the First District of the Illinois Appellate Court.
• Salary: $85,199

More about this posision here.

The Office of the State Appellate Defender seeks a mission-driven Assistant Appellate Defender for the 5th District, Mt. Vernon, Illinois. Duties and responsibilities include providing criminal appellate representation to indigent clients in the Illinois Appellate Court and Illinois Supreme Court by reading records, conducting research, drafting briefs and other documents, and presenting oral arguments. Criminal defense experience is a plus, but not a necessity. 

The starting salary is between $88,000 and $98,240, depending on the candidate’s relevant experience. Relevant qualifying experience includes employment as a law clerk for a reviewing court, and as an attorney in a criminal appeals office and/or public defender’s office.

Interested individuals should submit a resume and cover letter to the OSAD Human Resource department at osadhr@osad.state.il.us by August 7, 2026.

Remembering Bill Wines

By: Edward Kionka

If he had lived a few more years, William C. Wines would surely have been an early member of the Appellate Lawyers Association of Illinois (founded in 1968).

Bill was born and raised in Springfield, Illinois. He studied pre-law at the University of Illinois.* Graduating from Northwestern University School of Law in 1932, he began his legal career that year as an associate at the Chicago firm Chapman and Cutler. Two years later, he was a partner in Green, Costigan and Wines.

His father, William St. John Wines, was a prominent Springfield lawyer; his maternal grandfather was a circuit judge. According to newspaper articles, his ambition to follow his father into the legal profession began at age 7.

He debated in high school, college, and even during law school. He reportedly entered one contest at the last minute and won, defeating the other contestants who had been preparing for days or weeks.

He was said to be fluent in French, Spanish, and Italian. An article reported that he was a member of a winning debate team that competed in Spanish and defeated a Cuban team.

Bill became an assistant Illinois attorney general in 1941 and served as head of the AG’s appeals division from some time in the 1940s until February 1964. He represented the State of Illinois and its officers and agencies in hundreds of appeals before state and federal reviewing courts. Articles also describe his arguments in trial courts on legal issues.

The cases he briefed and argued before the United States Supreme Court include Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (a defendant’s acquittal in his federal criminal trial did not bar his prosecution for the same crime in state court); MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1945) (election requirements); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (validity of Illinois congressional districts); Illinois v. Michigan, 360 U.S. 712 (1959) (a massive original-jurisdiction dispute among several Great Lakes states over lake water diversion and sanitary district management); Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211 (1946) (habeas corpus was not the proper remedy); Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958) (successive trials for multiple murders committed at the same place and time are permissible); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946) (assistance of counsel); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944) (election issue); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) (validity of a provision of the community currency exchange act); and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (perjured testimony). There are more. In hundreds of other cases, the Supreme Court either denied certiorari or dismissed the appeal, but in most of those he probably would have briefed or opposed the petition.

He was counsel of record — usually lead counsel, we may assume — in hundreds of Illinois Supreme Court cases and in dozens of cases before nine of the eleven U.S. Courts of Appeals.

He also handled appeals for private clients, presumably when he was not an assistant attorney general. Articles suggest that he lectured in what we now call CLE courses.

Bill was an appellate lawyer in the 1940s and ‘50s and until 1964. Back then, a position like his was probably one of only a handful of ways you could specialize in appellate work.

Clearly, he was a great one. A Chicago Tribune article on his death states: “He was described as a ‘legal genius’ by several of his associates and attorneys who opposed him in court.” Other articles confirm this assessment.

*  *  *

Bill was also renowned for his sideline, writing the TV series They Stand Accused. A Chicago Tribune article (June 8, 1952) described his “crack Sunday night courtroom series now in its fifth year on television.” Here are excerpts from that article:

It is amazing enough that Wines has already produced more than 200 dramas. None are adaptations of actual cases. They’re all fiction. “They’re not true, but true to life,” Wines says. This prodigious output would constitute a career for the average man. But it’s only a well-paying hobby for the 43-year-old Chicago attorney. Wines is an assistant state’s [sic] attorney general who has argued 25 cases before the United States Supreme Court and lost only one. He has appeared before the Illinois Supreme Court more than 200 times.

They Stand Accused is by far the most realistic courtroom drama on television. Defense and prosecution are conducted by practicing Chicago attorneys with a little ham in them. Their courtroom haggling and legal skirmishes are real in the sense that there is no script. The attorneys as well as the actors absorb the story line written by Wines, then ad lib the show.

Authenticity is a fetish with the show’s producer, Jay Faraghan, who also acts as host, and Richard von Albrecht, associate producer. Roles of tough cops  have been played by some of the city’s finest. Medical testimony comes from real doctors and preachers have served as character witnesses.

When a drama called for a strip teaser, the show recruited Dardy Orlando, a professional ecdysiast and wife of Harold Minsky, the burlesque impresario. Her performance, though restricted to testimony, was memorable.

The realism Wines weaves into the dramas constantly catches viewers off guard and sometimes the performers as well. There was a lawyer, for example, who was so carried away by the TV drama he was participating in, he at one point leaped to his feet and requested a change of venue!

A Superior court judge was recruited to play the TV judge for a while. A cub newspaper woman, recognizing him as one of the judges on her county building beat, frantically called Wines to ask him where the “trial” was being held.

One story involved a French orphan who had fallen in love with a GI during the war. She came to America, learned her sweetheart had jilted her for another, and was now broke. After the telecast, a [woman] viewer called offering to adopt the comely “French orphan” ***.

*** Claire Baum, a professional actor, portrayed a nuclear physicist accused of murder. The jury found him guilty and the judge “sentenced” him to death, Wines recalled. Four months later Baum played a psychiatrist in another edition of They Stand Accused. An aroused viewer wrote a scorching letter objecting to the freeing of a convicted murderer. “He should have been executed long ago.”

Producers receive numerous fan letters protesting bitterly against acquittals or convictions, although they have no control over verdicts. The jury is selected from the audience. It differs from a real jury in only one point — because of TV time limitations, a majority instead of a unanimous ballot suffices.

While Wines’ prolific and adept pen astounds other practitioners in the trade, he does not impress himself particularly.

“I will run out of ideas when men and women run out of new ways of making fools of themselves at which time I will not only go off TV but stop practicing law as well.”

*** 

Wines is trying to dramatize how the problems of ordinary people in extraordinary situations are actually handled in a courtroom. And naturally he appreciates the $450 he receives for a story when the series is sponsored on the network.

“My writing is really the stuff of my life,” Bill said. “The TV writers I respect are the boys who do the mysteries. I don’t see how they can come up with something so clever and unrealistic week after week. That takes talent. It’s much easier for me because I personally know a number of murderers, dope fiends, and bank robbers.”

And as an afterthought, with a pixy grin on his face, William C. Wines added: “And some TV executives.”

*   *   *

They Stand Accused was a major hit. It began broadcasting on WGN-TV in April 1948. In 1949, it was fed to the CBS network under the title “Cross Question.” In January 1950, when WGN became an affiliate, the show moved to the DuMont network and reverted to its original title, They Stand Accused. Its run ended on December 30, 1954.

*    *   *

Tragically, Bill died in his office at 160 North LaSalle Street in Chicago on the morning of February 21, 1964. He was 54. Many described his death as a major loss to the legal profession. We can imagine it was also a loss for the soon-to-be-formed ALA.

*   *   *

Fredda Longfield Wines, Bill’s wife, was an accomplished violinist. One article said she had “been on national concert tour and guest artist with symphonies and well-known radio presentations.” “Her concerts have received high praise from critics.” Illinois State Register, Nov. 9, 1941, p. 23. She reportedly began playing in church and school at age 5. According to one article, she “debuted” at 9, and owned “one of the rarest of the old master violins in the world . . . made in Cremona, Italy, in 1572, by Andrea Amati, founder of the Cremona school of violin making and designer of the present form of the violin.” Columbia Daily Tribune, Oct. 30, 1929, p. 1. She graduated from the Kansas City-Horner Conservatory in 1930 and from the American Conservatory of Music in Chicago, where she studied under Mischa Mischakoff, an outstanding Ukrainian-American violinist and one of the most famous concertmasters in the United States, who was then concertmaster of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra. Fredda reportedly also won a scholarship to the Juilliard School of Music. Articles report on many of her public performances.

Fredda and Bill married in Springfield on November 15, 1941, after years of courtship. He was 32; she was 30. She outlived him by 27 years. They are buried side by side at Oak Ridge Cemetery in Springfield.

* Bill attended the University of Illinois, but I was unable to determine whether he earned a degree. At that time, it was possible to enter Northwestern University School of Law after only three years of undergraduate study. He would have been 23 when he graduated from law school (he was born in April 1909), so it’s unlikely he completed an undergraduate degree.

Don Wall, who served as Counsel to the Circuit Executive of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for more than 25 years, passed away on May 15, 2026. Don was a fixture at the Seventh Circuit and was respected by all who had an opportunity to cross professional paths with him. His obituary can be found here. 

AI and The Sorcerer’s Apprentice

An essay by Edward J. Kionka1

        According to the legal news, all of us in the legal profession — lawyers, law firms, judges, law clerks, paralegals, law students, law professors, administrators — are rushing to hop on the AI2 bandwagon. Perhaps some of us are trying to use it too much, too soon.

        Do you remember the story of the sorcerer’s apprentice? It originated in a 1797 poem by Goethe. As an old sorcerer leaves his workshop, he assigns his apprentice to fetch water. Tiring of making trips carrying a heavy pail, the apprentice enchants a broom to do the work for him, using magic in which he’s not fully trained. The floor soon floods, and the apprentice realizes he can’t stop the broom because he doesn’t know the magic required. He splits the broom in two with an ax, but each piece becomes a whole broom, and both brooms continue fetching water. The entire room floods. When all seems lost, the old sorcerer returns and breaks the spell, admonishing the apprentice that only a master should invoke powerful spirits. (Walt Disney’s animated short, Fantasia3, popularized Goethe’s story to a worldwide audience.)

        Are we like the apprentice, with AI as the magic?

        Learning AI is difficult and time-consuming. I’m not sure how solo or small-firm lawyers will find the time and patience to master it. AI is rapidly becoming part of law school curricula, so perhaps the next generation of lawyers will be up to speed early on. BigLaw is spending big bucks to develop proprietary AI platforms (see Appendix). The Illinois Supreme Court appointed an AI Task Force. The Illinois State Bar Association has a Standing Committee on Artificial Intelligence and the Practice of Law, and its steering committee has begun vetting AI apps. The entire Illinois court system, from the top down, is using AI.

        The simple truth is that whoever you are — law student, lawyer, paralegal, judge, law teacher, legal administrator — you have no choice. You must learn to use the appropriate AI tools and apply them to your work as best you can.

        Some experts predict we will soon have AGI (artificial general intelligence) that can understand, learn, and apply knowledge across any intellectual task, just like a human. After that, they say, will come ASI (artificial superintelligence), a theoretical AI that would surpass human intelligence and capabilities across all fields, including creativity, general wisdom, and problem-solving. If and when ASI arrives, we’re all in trouble. Robots will be the next species, and they won’t need humans.

        At present, however, we have only narrow AI (ANI), which performs specific, predefined tasks, such as facial recognition, voice assistants, and playing chess. For our purposes, these tasks include retrieving information (legal research, data collection), drafting documents (pleadings, contracts, legal briefs and memoranda), and analyzing and summarizing documents.

        As you surely know, you’re already using ANI every day — for example, when you do a Google search, use a maps app, or ask Siri or Alexa for information.

        When I started using Westlaw for legal research, we had to use Boolean syntax for queries. Today, we can use full natural-language sentences. You can enter a narrow legal question (1-2 sentences) in the main search bar and get a direct answer with hyperlinked citations. You can also use Westlaw Deep Research.4 Lexis+ offers similar capabilities.

        Thomson Reuters also offers Westlaw’s Co-Counsel Legal and Lexis offers Protégé, both of which they claim can create timelines, gather surveys across jurisdictions, analyze and update contract terms, outline arguments, identify affirmative defenses, draft, summarize, or compare documents, find potential claims, research legal questions, identify contradictions in witness statements, summarize filing deadlines, adjust the tone of a draft document, and suggest courses of action. vLex Fastcase integrates AI-driven legal tools, including AI drafting tools such as Clearbrief, allowing lawyers to access case law while drafting in Microsoft Word. vLex Fastcase is available free to ISBA members.

        Popular standalone AI tools that are not legal-specific include ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, Perplexity, Copilot, and others. Gemini is Google’s AI assistant, and Copilot is Microsoft’s. If you use Google or Microsoft apps, you already have access to Gemini and Copilot. Apple’s Siri is a basic AI, but Apple plans to make it a more capable generative AI through Apple Intelligence and partnerships with platforms like Gemini.

        Legal-specific AI plugins and purpose-built applications — for example, CoCounsel (by Thomson Reuters), Claude for Legal (from Anthropic), and Spellbook (Microsoft), which runs inside Microsoft Word — are now available, along with many others. OpenAI will soon offer legal-specific tools.

        NotebookLM is a special-purpose AI app that works only with the data you supply. This is hugely important because using open tools such as ChatGPT and including actual client or case information in your submission can lead to improper disclosure of confidential or privileged information and raise serious professional responsibility issues.

        The Illinois Supreme Court adopted a Policy on Artificial Intelligence, effective January 1, 2025.5 Briefly, the use of AI is permitted and encouraged, provided the user complies with existing legal and ethical rules (see Appendix).

        Although AI characteristics can be classified in multiple ways, for our purposes, we will focus on two: generative AI and traditional AI.

• Generative AI creates new, original content — text, images, video, audio, or code — from user prompts.
• Traditional or Classic AI relies on programmed rules and logic. Rather than creating new content, it performs specific tasks such as legal research, finding other information, making predictions, classifying data, or recognizing patterns using existing information. It’s like a research assistant that can also summarize, organize, and perform similar tasks.

So what’s not to like?

        First and foremost, AI is too prone to errors and hallucinations. This is especially true of generative AI. In tests of generative AI in legal contexts, hallucination and error rates ranged from 17% to 33%.6

        Here’s an example using a recent event and traditional AI.

        In an April 2026 game, Joe Adell, the Los Angeles Angels’ right fielder, made three amazing over-the-wall catches that robbed the Seattle Mariners of three home runs.7 The Angels won 1-0. Did Joe have the greatest defensive game in MLB history? A sports writer asked one of the most prominent AI tools. The AI’s response was negative; the greatest was Ozzie Smith’s performance against the Dodgers in 1978, when he recorded 13 assists at shortstop, “a modern-era record.” The response went on to elaborate on the game and his performance. It sounded so credible.

        Except it was totally false. No such game was played. And Ozzie never had 13 assists in any game that year. In fact, Ozzie never had 13 assists in any game he played in the big leagues.

        The bot also described “other famous defensive masterpieces worth mentioning.” However, the details of another supposed defensive gem were significantly inaccurate.

        To see examples of hallucinations and errors in generative AI, one need only read the legal news. Hardly a day goes by without a story about a lawyer or law firm that was sanctioned — and embarrassed — when the court discovered that a case cited and even discussed did not exist. A database recently identified more than 1,000 U.S. legal cases with fabricated citations, misquoted authority, or other AI-generated legal errors.

        When I read these stories, my first thought is, “Where did you go to law school?” In the first semester of my first year of law school, my legal writing instructor taught: “Never cite a case you haven’t read.” Despite some lawyers’ protests to the contrary (which unfortunately lack credibility), there is no doubt that these fake citations and discussions were produced by generative AI.

        Another problem with using generative AI to produce a draft of your brief, memo, or opinion letter is that, even if the authorities are accurate and authentic, and the draft reads well, it may not be the best you can do. It may even be defective. You won’t realize that because you didn’t marshal the facts and the law yourself and you didn’t use your brain to craft the writing.

        Good legal writing — briefs or other documents — is part education, part training, part skill, but also an art. Words are the lawyer’s tools; you are a wordsmith. Words can be combined in countless ways. Robots aren’t the best legal writers, yet. You can do better.

        Recently, I wrote a brief that required a line-by-line analysis of the record. Doing so, I noticed something that led me to a new way to frame an argument. It turned out to be a winner. If I had delegated that part of the brief to AI, I’m quite sure that argument would never have been made.

        In another appeal, the circuit court’s ruling rested solely on estoppel. I wanted to make a laches argument. I found a brief reference to laches in the administrative hearing transcript. Browsing cases, I found an Illinois Supreme Court opinion that opened the door for me to argue laches in my brief. I don’t trust that my robot would have found that path.

        That’s what it comes down to — trust. In several recent CLE courses, the instructor advised treating AI like a student law clerk or a first-year associate. Use it to gather information but verify the results. Do the writing yourself. Use AI research as a springboard for your own work. That seems like sound advice.

Using AI in brief writing

        Rather than tell you what you should do (that’s up to you), I will tell you how I use it.

        Jeff Su, the instructor in many YouTube videos (four are cited in the Appendix), uses an airplane cockpit analogy to illustrate three ways to use AI.

        First is autopilot mode. You hand the task to AI with clear instructions and trust the output with minimal review. The AI handles everything on its own. Think level flight.

        In handling an appeal, there is not much in this category. Possibly looking up rules to confirm dates or requirements, finding a single case by its citation, finding something in the record where a basic search won’t do, simple tasks like that. For example: “How many plays did Shakespeare write?”8 I use it all the time to check words, phrases, and facts.

        Some use AI to summarize testimony or documents, but I wouldn’t totally trust it for that job.

        Second is collaboration mode. You and AI iterate together through multiple rounds until the output meets your standard. Neither you nor AI could have produced the result alone. Think takeoff and landing.

        Legal research is the best example, but this mode can be used for anything short of writing as long as the result can be verified. In their output, some AI tools include a link or reference to the source, a very useful way to verify.

        Third is manual mode. You do the work yourself because AI either can’t do it well, or the risk of getting it wrong is too high. Think in-flight emergency.

        Manual is my writing mode. I believe the brief I craft myself will be superior to one written by a robot, no matter how good the robot is — at least for now. In other words, I don’t trust a robot to write my brief, not even the first draft.

        There is one AI app I use when editing my writing — Grammarly. In my experience, it’s quite good. It has made my writing better and more concise. Other similar apps include Copilot (integrated into Microsoft 365), ProWriting Aid, Hemingway, Linguix, Readable, WordTune, QuillBot, Ginger, and others. But I always work interactively with Grammarly, and I don’t accept all of its suggestions.

        A recent CLE course identified skills that AI cannot replace:

• Intuition
• Credibility/trustworthiness
• Empathy
• Critical thinking
• Information literacy
• Professional judgment

        Bryan Garner, widely regarded as one of America’s top legal writing gurus, argues that high-level writing tasks — including legal drafting, literary style, and persuasive argument — remain a uniquely human domain where style, tone, and ethical considerations matter. Critical thinking, originality, and ethical communication are integral to writing, and these elements can never be outsourced to AI. Good writers, he says, will always have the edge, especially over those who allow their skills to wither by overrelying on AI.

        Aristotle taught that the three principles of persuasive rhetoric are logos (logic), ethos (credibility), and pathos (in our context, your reader wants you to win). As far as I know, ANI will not do ethos and pathos as well as you and I, if at all.

        Writing — especially legal writing — is hard work. We are all lazy by nature. It’s our genetic heritage. AI is a tempting shortcut. We may think it can save our client money, make an appeal more affordable, or save our own precious time. But our objectives are to (1) win and (2) provide the maximum possible assistance to the reader, in both content and form. In legal writing, as in all other work, we should use the best tool available at each step. More often than not, that tool is the human brain.

Appendix

BigLaw

• Kirkland & Ellis is developing a proprietary AI platform and is prepared to spend about $500 million on its AI build over the next three to four years.
• Other firms are using commercial AI platforms, such as Harvey or Legora, or using AI tools for a specific part of a client matter rather than for the entire matter.
• Sullivan & Cromwell partnered with a firm to develop AI discovery and deposition assistants.
• Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton acquired the LLM developer Springbook AI.
• White and Case created its own tool.
• Troutman Pepper Locke developed its own AI chatbot adding agentic AI capabilities, and incorporated Thomson Reuters’ Deep Research.

Illinois Supreme Court Policy and Guidelines

• Permitted Use: Litigants, attorneys, judges, and court staff are permitted and encouraged to use AI.
• Ethical Compliance: All use of technology must strictly comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
• Total Accountability: Attorneys, judges, and self-represented individuals bear ultimate responsibility for their final work product.
• Mandatory Verification: Users must thoroughly review all AI-generated content for accuracy before submitting it to the court.
• Required Competence: Before using any tool, users must understand both the general capabilities of AI and the specific functions of the software.

Some AI videos

• www.youtube.com/watch?v=nVyD6THcvDQ (AI basics)
• www.youtube.com/watch?v=htZRCE2GgIs (Part 1: The Only AI Tools You Need)
• www.youtube.com/watch?v=aH9ctWaxGgQ (Part 2: Productivity & Creative AI)
• www.youtube.com/watch?v=s_765enJBy8 (Things that AI can’t replace)

Footnotes

1 The author is a retired law professor and a not-yet-retired appellate lawyer. See www.KionkaLaw.com. Disclosure: I used AI in researching and writing this essay. All info is believed to be current as of June 2026. © 2026 Edward Kionka

2 If you don’t know the first thing about Artificial Intelligence, my friend, you are at the bottom of a long, steep hill.

3 https://youtu.be/UEEMzrKAeNc

4www.thomsonreuters.com/en-us/help/cocounsel/legal/skills/skills-prompts-workflows/westlaw-deep-research

5ilcourtsaudio.blob.core.windows.net/antilles-resources/resources/e43964ab-8874-4b7a-be4e-63af019cb6f7/Illinois%20Supreme%20Court%20AI%20Policy.pdf.See also www.illinoiscourts.gov/News/1485/Illinois-Supreme-Court-Announces-Policy-on-Artificial-Intelligence/news-detail.

6 https://hai.stanford.edu/news/ai-trial-legal-models-hallucinate-1-out-6-or-more-benchmarking-queries

7 https://youtu.be/Ru3xR5_IFtQ

8 The correct answer is, we don’t know exactly. Scholars mostly agree that he wrote 37-39, a few in collaboration with other playwrights. We know of two lost plays, Cardenio and Love’s Labour’s Won. Probably there were others. The First Folio contains 36 plays. In this case, AI got it right.

9 https://lawprose.org/bryan-garner

By: Angela Reaney

In Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. 226 (2025), the Supreme Court vacated Richard Glossip’s capital murder conviction finding that the state’s failure to correct its star witness’s known false testimony denied Glossip due process. The decision relied on Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), holding that a conviction must be reversed when the state fails to correct known false evidence and the error was material in that it could have played a role in the conviction.

In 1997, Glossip managed a hotel in Oklahoma City that was owned by Barry Van Treese. Justin Sneed, a 19-year-old with a history of violence and methamphetamine use, lived in one of the hotel rooms in exchange for work at the hotel. One day, when Van Treese arrived to collect cash deposits, Sneed beat him to death with a baseball bat.

Glossip first told police that he did not know about the murder but admitted a day later that Sneed confessed to the murder. Before interviewing Sneed, officers told him that “before he made up his mind on anything, they wanted him to hear some of the things they had to say.” They proceeded to tell Sneed they knew he did not act alone and should not “take the whole thing.” They also told him that “everybody was making Sneed the scapegoat in this,” especially Glossip. Following the officers’ lead, Sneed told the officers that Glossip asked him to rob Van Treese and the robbery went wrong. Both Glossip and Sneed were charged with capital murder.

Glossip rejected a deal to avoid the death penalty in exchange for his testimony against Sneed. Sneed, however, accepted the same deal in exchange for his testimony against Glossip.

Glossip was tried twice. Sneed’s testimony was the only evidence tying Glossip to the murder. At the first trial, Sneed testified that Glossip asked him to kill Van Trease, but he did not know the motive. He admitted killing Van Treese with a baseball bat but denied using a knife. An Oklahoma court reversed finding Glossip was denied the effective assistance of counsel.

Before the second trial, the prosecutor learned that a medical examiner would testify that Van Treese was killed with a baseball bat and a knife. Without notice to the defense, Sneed changed his testimony and admitted to stabbing Van Treese, consistent with the medical examiner’s testimony. Sneed also denied ever seeing a psychiatrist or taking lithium before his arrest.

Years later, the State produced eight boxes of evidence that were never disclosed. The new evidence included a note from the prosecutor to Sneed’s attorney, dated before the second trial, stating she wanted to talk to Sneed about the medical examiner’s testimony that Van Treese was stabbed. The boxes also contained Sneed’s letters to the prosecutor stating that he wanted to recant and the prosecutor’s notes establishing that she knew about Sneed’s bipolar disorder and lithium prescription.

Based on the new evidence, Glossip filed a postconviction petition raising a Napue claim. Although the state agreed reversal was warranted, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Glossip’s conviction. The court found, in relevant part, that the prosecutor could not knowingly conceal information where the defense had knowledge.

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, finding that the prosecutor’s failure to correct Sneed amounted to a denial of due process. It noted that the prosecutor knew about Sneed’s bipolar diagnosis and lithium prescription because she had his medical records and a competency evaluation in which he reported the lithium prescription. Moreover, the prosecutor’s notes established that she knew about the prescription. She, therefore, was required to correct Sneed.

The Court also found that the due process violation was material. Sneed’s testimony was the only evidence of Glossip’s guilt, and the failure to correct Sneed’s testimony affected the jury’s credibility determination. The Court further noted that, although the prosecutor told the jury in closing that Sneed was harmless absent Glossip’s influence, evidence established that bipolar disorder combined with methamphetamine use could trigger impulsive violence.

The state court misapplied Napue when it found that the prosecution could not “knowingly conceal[]” the lithium prescription because the defense knew about it. The duty to correct false testimony, the Court explained, falls on the state and not the defense.

Oklahoma has elected to retry Glossip for noncapital murder. He is currently in jail awaiting retrial.

Angela Reaney is a criminal defense attorney focusing on direct appeal and postconviction cases.

Angela's Email: areaney@reaneylaw.com

In February 2026, the Appellate Lawyers Association wrote to the Hon. Mary L. Mikva, Chair of the Executive Committee of Illinois Appellate Court, First Judicial District, to recommend a change to the First District's Local Rule 22 regarding the filing of paper copies of electronically filed briefs. On May 15, 2026, a majority of the justices of the First District voted to approve the ALA's recommended change. Specifically, Local Rule 22(e) has been amended to make clear that a filer need not "file" a previously electronically filed brief.

On the same date, a majority of the justices of the First District also voted to approve a change to Local Rule 21 to revise and clarify that mediators must either be a sitting judge of the Appellate Court or a pro bono attorney with appropriate training and appointed by the Court. Additionally, the process of assigning cases to mediation has been clarified for consistency with Supreme Court Rule 310.1. 

The amended rules can be found here.